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1. Introduction 
 
Unity has for long been an important concept within the fields of musicology and 
music theory. Richard Cohn and Douglas Dempster state that the principal and most 
persistent canon (in the sense of law or rule) governing our Western aesthetic is that 
‘successful works of art, including the “masterpieces” of Western art music, exhibit 
unity, coherence, or “organic” integrity’ (Cohn and Dempster 1992, 156). Fred 
Everett Maus equally notes that ‘[u]nity is a familiar criterion of value for individual 
musical compositions, especially for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European 
instrumental music and related twentieth-century traditions’ (Maus 1999, 171). 
However, as Maus notes, recent discussions suggest that the content and status of this 
criterion may be unclear. ‘Perhaps we do not always know what we mean by “musical 
unity”; perhaps unity (whatever it is) is not as important or as central as we have 
sometimes believed,’ Maus writes (ibid.). 
 
What is musical unity? Maus (ibid., 184) lists a variety of words and expressions 
associated with musical unity: ‘coherence’, ‘completeness’, ‘comprehensiveness’, 
‘fusion’, ‘integrity’, ‘integration’, ‘logic’, ‘organic unity’, ‘perfection’, ‘self-
sufficiency’, ‘synthesis’, ‘totality’, ‘wholeness’. While some of these seem to be 
species of unity (‘coherence’, ‘fusion’, ‘wholeness’), others do not (‘logic’, ‘self-
sufficiency’) (ibid.). However, the relation to unity is, according to Maus, clear in the 
latter cases as well. He writes: ‘when a sequence of musical events is called logical, 
the point is that the events go together in a certain way; an ascription of self-
sufficiency suggests a unified whole that is separated from some exterior’ (ibid.). 
 
Likewise, Robert P. Morgan (2003) suggests that unity should not be seen as an all-
encompassing idea, but rather as an approach where disparate musical elements work 
towards a common and coherent goal. Morgan writes on musical unity: 
 
It is not the sort of absolute unity proposed by certain idealistic philosophers, such as 
F. S. Bradley, according to whom everything is seamlessly integrated into the One, 
thus negating all relationships. Nor is it of the sort represented by Aristotelian unities 
of time, place and action. Rather, the unity asserted by music analysts acknowledges 
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the coexistence of distinct and contrasting elements, but finds that, however 
differentiated these may be, they work together to produce a common and coherent 
goal. (Morgan 2003, 21–22.) 
 
Morgan further contends that belief in such coherence obviously shapes the analyst’s 
perspective; but most analysts would argue that there are aspects of the music that 
render their search for unity appropriate: 
 
When the analysts … state that a certain musical event, or formal segment, lacks 
unity, they are in essence claiming that some aspect of the work is lacking in 
coherence. Under certain circumstances that may be justified, and even analytically 
supportable; but it does not seem to be what propels [some] analysts … They do not 
fault the piece but the way we understand it. (Morgan 2003, 22.) 
 
Equally, Maus (1999, 179) seriously questions that claims about musical unity should 
appear simply as assertions about compositions, without showing the relation of the 
alleged compositional unity to musical experiences. Instead, he suggests three other 
bearers of musical unity. First, there is the unity of a listening experience (ibid.). 
Second, there is the idea that unity belongs to a world, in the sense that listening to a 
successful piece of instrumental music gives one access to a particular world, which 
can be visited, explored, perhaps inhabited, perhaps just contemplated (ibid., 181). 
And third, Maus suggests that unity can belong to a story somehow communicated by 
the music (ibid., 182). 
 
Although an important aesthetic criterion—or precisely for that reason—unity has 
also been seriously questioned as a musical value. For some of the fiercest attacks on 
unity in modern musicology, see Kerman (1980; 1985) and Street (1989). Morgan 
(2003, 22) identifies a certain ‘negative attitude towards unity’ in contemporary 
musical scholarship, which he ascribes to a ‘comprehensive recent epistemological 
transformation that has influenced attitudes about truth and knowledge’ (ibid.). 
Particularly, he argues, certain ‘postmodernist’ ideas have come to influence 
contemporary musical scholarship. Among these is the idea that all language is 
necessarily metaphorical: 
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Like all discourse, musical analysis cannot escape language’s open-ended universe of 
plural meanings. Works of art are not simply there (‘present’) as independent objects, 
but are in constant transformation, linked to the shifting cultural and historical 
conditions that shape them and our understanding of them. … Unity no longer resides 
in the composition but is subjectively posited solely by the analyst, with no more 
value than any other judgement. A focus on unity, moreover, exaggerates the integrity 
of the whole, making us blind to inconsistencies and discontinuities that would 
emerge under less restrictive interpretative rubrics. (Morgan 2003, 22–23.) 
 
Morgan notes that suspicion towards unity in the arts has a long history, dating back 
at least to Friedrich Schlegel and other early romantics (ibid.). The difference, 
however, between these earlier and current trends is that the earlier ones did not stress 
disunity to the same extent as the present-day (ibid.). Today, Maus, among others, 
claims that ‘if analysis can display musical unity, then it must also have the capacity 
to display disunity. … If one can assert, for instance, that two passages present 
motivically related material, then, by the same criterion of relatedness, it should be 
meaningful to assert that a third passage lacks that motivic feature.’ (Maus 1999, 
171.) Morgan theorises on the relation between analysis and (dis)unity: 
 
Analysis is based on the assumption that music ‘makes sense’, without which it 
makes no sense itself as a discipline. Its purpose is thus to show how music makes 
sense or, more rarely, how it fails to make sense. In the case of music that is 
‘intentionally’ disunified, then, it tries to show that the disunity is itself meaningful—
that is, connects with and supports other matters. What seems disunified at one level 
turns out to be unified at another. Simply to claim that a composition lacks unity, 
however, is only to say that it fails, leaving it indistinguishable from any others that 
fail. … Put differently, the mere claim that a composition lacks unity necessarily 
silences the analyst. (Morgan 2003, 27.) 
 
Essentially, Morgan calls for an underlying logic justifying the incoherencies, and for 
an analysis vital enough to show these connections. In the case of music that is 
‘intentionally’ disunified, music analysis ought to show how the disunity is itself 
meaningful. And if there is no logic to be discerned, then it makes no sense to engage 
with analysis (which tries to make sense out of music). 
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Aim of the study 
 
The aim of the present study is to explore how unity has been perceived and 
comprehended in five Anglo-American musicological or music-theoretical writings 
on Beethoven’s Op. 132, first movement, published between 1987 and 2009. That is, 
to explore how the musical work has been seen on a unity–disunity axis and how 
unity has been understood in the musical work. The focus of this essay is, first and 
foremost, texts on the music rather than the music itself. 
 
The writers, whose texts are treated in the present study, are, in chronological order, 
Kofi V. Agawu (1987/1991), Robin Wallace (1989), Daniel Chua (1995), Susan 
McClary (2000), and Frank Samarotto (2009). Agawu’s study of the first movement 
of Op. 132 first appeared in 1987 as an article (Agawu 1987), and four years later as a 
book chapter in Playing with signs (Agawu 1991). Being for the most part a critique 
of Agawu and McClary, Robert S. Hatten’s (2004) comments on Op. 132 will be 
treated only briefly. Michael Spitzer’s (2006) study of Beethoven’s late style 
including his discussion on Op. 132 will be referred to only occasionally. While 
Spitzer’s book is useful for explicating Adorno’s fragmentary comments on the 
strategic moments of Beethoven’s Op. 132, his theory of Beethoven’s late style does 
not bring anything original to the discussion as regards the unity of the work. Other 
writings could be treated as well. However, for instance, Greg Vitercik’s (1993) 
article on structure and expression in Beethoven’s Op. 132 has not been included as it 
is essentially a reply to Wallace (1989). Likewise, Sylvia Imeson’s (1996) study on 
paradox in late Beethoven has been excluded as it relates only implicitly to the 
subject. My discussion of unity is confined to unity as it appears in the texts of Agawu 
(1991), Wallace (1989), Chua (1995), McClary (2000) and Samarotto (2009). Apart 
from those texts, I will not be dealing with the vast unity debate that raged in recent 
years. Nor will I deal with concepts of unity of Beethoven’s contemporaries. 
 
All five texts appear in different contexts. Wallace’s (1989) discussion of Beethoven’s 
Op. 132 appears in an article on the music’s expressive dimensions. As a test case, he 
suggests that in Op. 132, ‘deliberate ambiguity, which is an expression of music’s 
potential for diversity rather than organic coherence, is an essential part of the work's 
emotional content, and hence of its “message”’ (Wallace 1989, 5). Agawu’s (1991) 
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study of Op. 132 is part of a larger discussion of the interplay between domains in 
Viennese Classic music in general. Agawu is especially interested in instances where 
the events in the different domains do not coincide. Daniel Chua (1995, 6) talks of his 
book as ‘a translation of Adorno’s philosophy of music into actual analysis.’ He 
attempts to bridge the gap between the ‘sheer inadequacy of traditional theory and the 
works themselves’ (ibid.). Furthermore, he argues that, in Op. 132, there are 
‘processes at work which cause an entire piece to unfold with a logic that creates the 
peculiarities of the score’ (ibid., 5). This is called a ‘structured disruption’, an 
analytical paradox; the very logic that analysis tries to uncover is also the cause of the 
illogicalities in the work: ‘The music forces analysis away from the hallowed concept 
of unity towards paradox, ambiguity, and disconnection,’ Chua argues (ibid.). 
McClary’s (2000) presentation of Op. 132 appears in a collection of lectures, where 
she seeks to explore the social premises and cultural context of Op. 132 through 
conventions. Finally, Samarotto’s (2009) text on Beethoven’s Op. 132 appears in a 
collection of essays presenting nine different writers’ perspectives on sonata forms. 
Consequently, Samarotto’s study is largely concerned with the ‘notoriously 
idiosyncratic distortion of sonata form’ (ibid., 1) as well as issues of tonality and 
temporality. Thus, in the present study, unity and disunity will mainly be discussed in 
terms of form, motives, topical significance, emotional content, voice-leading and 
harmony, but less in terms of expression, gestures, narratives and dramaturgy. 
 
Likewise, all five writers represent different scholarly traditions. Schenkerian 
methodology is a common denominator, but all writers mix Schenkerian analysis with 
other methods: McClary is connected with new musicology and literary theory, 
Samarotto is engaged with aspects of temporal and formal analysis, Wallace with 
issues of expression, Agawu with semiotic interpretation and Chua with his own 
home-made hotchpotch of Schenkerian and other analytical methods. Because the 
writers concerned represent a variety of scholarly traditions and because they do not 
always define their views on unity/disunity overtly, the writers’ views will be 
presented in their own context, thematically organised under four rubrics: unity of 
surface, unity of form, unity of subsurface and motivic unity. The chapter on motivic 
unity will be devoted entirely to Daniel Chua’s (1995) view, for reasons that will be 
explicated in that chapter. I will spare the reader my own comments until the 
discussion in Chapter 6, where I will do a more thorough comparison between the 
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different views. The findings will be related to Maus’s attributes of unity presented at 
the beginning of this chapter, and Morgan’s call for appropriate forms of analysis. 
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2. Unity of surface 
 
In this chapter, I will present arguments regarding the unity of the surface in the first 
movement of Op. 132. I will concentrate on the views presented by Kofi Agawu 
(1991) and Susan McClary (2000), who explore unity on the surface level through 
topical signification, contrast, surface continuity, and issues of meaning. For Agawu, 
this means identifying and listing topics, whereas McClary is concerned with 
arguments regarding the shattered subjectivity communicated in the music. My focus 
will be on the first 48 bars of the movement. To begin with, I will examine Agawu’s 
take on contrast as an aesthetic premise for Beethoven’s late quartets. 
 
Agawu’s view 
 
For Agawu, perhaps the most striking characteristic of the first movement of Op. 132 
is the ‘extreme contrast that dominates the musical surface’ (1991, 112). According to 
Agawu, contrast is a common characteristic of many of Beethoven’s late quartets, 
whether it is a contrast between movements or within a single movement, as in the 
case of the first movement of Op. 132. Agawu also quotes Walter Riezler’s 
characterisation of the condition of contrast, where Riezler states that ‘[in the late 
style,] Beethoven’s contrasts … acquired an altogether unparalleled profundity’ and 
that, in the first movement of Op. 132, ‘contrasts prevail without interruption’ 
(Riezler 1938, 235, quoted in Agawu 1991, 112). For Agawu, the dual implication of 
Riezler’s insight is, on one hand, ‘that contrast be taken as the basic premise for 
analysis, so that norms are formulated with the premise of discontinuity rather than 
continuity … and on the other, that the threat to coherence implicit in this condition is 
ameliorated by the pull of a background structure in which these contrasts are 
regularized’ (ibid., 112). In an attempt to establish the ‘phenomenological validity of 
contrast’ (ibid., 113), Agawu offers a description of the many contrasted events that 
take place on the first page of the score: 
 
The slow and regular half-note figuration that dominates the first seven and a half 
bars is followed, or rather, interrupted, by a rapid sixteenth-note figure in the first 
violin (measures 9–10). Then, with the emergence of what appears to be a coherent 
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musical idea or motif (the dotted figure in measure 11, cello), the music seems to be 
on its way—but only for eight measures, for midway through measure 18 another 
erratic change occurs, arresting the motion in the manner of measures 9–10, and 
leading not to a relatively stable passage as before, but to a full Adagio measure on 
six-four harmony (measure 21), a partial recollection of the effect of the opening 
measures. This, in turn, gives way in measure 22 to the sixteenth-note idea from 
measure 9, and then to the dotted figure again in measure 23. On this immediate level 
of structure, then, there is much change, contrast, and, summarily, instability. 
Riezler’s characterization of this musical surface in terms of “contrasts … without 
interruption” is shown to be particularly apt. (Agawu 1991, 112–3.) 
 
Agawu later leads us to the identification of topics, the resulting list of which is 
reproduced as Figure 1. In addition, Agawu, again, offers a verbal description of the 
events taking place until the appearance of the secondary key area in bar 48, now with 
spotted topics. Let me quote him at length: 
 
Measures 1–8 suggest learned style by virtue of the strict almost fugal-expository 
imitation. … The temporal unit is alla breve, and the slow tempo, soft dynamics, and 
generic thwarting of expectations—what sort of piece is this?—conspire to create a 
sense of fantasy. The conjunction of learned style and fantasy already encapsulates a 
conflict, for fantasy implies a lack of order and discipline, whereas learned style 
implies the strictest possible discipline. Measures 9–10 suggest, in their 
improvisatory, virtuosic, and unmeasured manner, a cadenza, while the dotted-note 
idea initiated by the cello in measure 11 is clearly a reference to a march (whose 
narrow range and sighing effect hint simultaneously at singing style). … We hear 
hints of the learned style in measures 15–17, while the celebratory triadic outline in 
measures 18–19 describes a fanfare; in addition, given its disposition within a musical 
context in which contrast is a premise and such aural flights emerge almost 
unannounced, we can hear hints of the midcentury sensibility style in measures 19–
21. The first violin cadenza returns in measures 21–22, followed by march in 
measures [sic] 23, from which point it begins to establish itself as the main topic of 
the movement. A striking, if parenthetical reference to gavotte may be heard in 
measure 40, and the brief imitation of the head of this dance suggests learned style. 
We will refer to a gavotte in learned style underpinned by march, a complex from 
which the listener selects one or two components depending on which line of 
discourse he or she wishes to follow. Finally, with the arrival of the second key, an 
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Figure 1. Topics in Beethoven’s String Quartet in A Minor, Op. 132, 
first movement after Agawu (1991, 115). 
Italian aria emerges, complete with an introductory vamp and near-heterophonic 
presentation. From this point onward, no generically new topics are introduced with 
the exception of the brilliant style, which serves to provide an appropriate flourish for 
the end of the movement. (Agawu 1991, 114.) 
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As Agawu shows, the first 48 bars comprise a total of eight topics, sometimes shifting 
rapidly and even sounding simultaneously in the first eight bars. Agawu notes that 
‘faced with such an unstable musical surface’ as that of Op. 132, contemporary music 
analysis of the 1980s, especially that of the ‘neo-Schenkerian variety,’ invokes the 
neutral notion of design to account for changes of texture and figuration (Agawu 
1991, 113). However, Agawu rejects the ‘general principle’ proposed by John 
Rothgeb (1977, 73, quoted in Agawu, 113), according to which changes in surface 
design usually coincide with crucial structural points. Agawu’s main objection 
towards the notion of design concerns the implication that the variables that generate 
a musical surface are in any sense neutral or value-free (ibid., 113). As Agawu notes: 
‘To hold this view is to remove oneself completely from the implications of an 
intertextual musical discourse in which referentiality plays a major role’ (ibid., 114). 
Therefore, Agawu suggests his ‘semiotic approach sensitive to the historical and 
stylistic specificity of this particular musical surface’ instead of Rothgeb’s notion of 
an ‘ahistorical, value-free design’ (ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, Agawu suggests that, in the movement, the succession of topics reveals 
a gradual shift from metric instability to metric stability. The learned style in the 
beginning defines a pulse, the cadenza then erases this pulse. The march is presented 
and the arrival of the gavotte reinforces the shift toward metric regularity, a condition 
that is fully established with the arrival of aria. ‘A process of destabilization begins 
soon after the aria, and from this point on we experience various dynamic transitions 
to and from metric regularity’ (ibid., 117). As Agawu notes: 
 
The ‘background’ of this movement as defined by topical signification consists, 
therefore, not of a pitch-defined, arhythmic Ursatz, but rather of a rhythmically 
defined functional stability that moves in and out of subsidiary levels of instability. 
One therefore does not impose a dimensional hierarchy on the piece, but approaches 
the idea of background metaphorically. (Agawu 1991, 117.) 
 
Agawu (1991, 117) suggests the erratic surface, the understatement of most topics, 
and the overall quality of instability make up for a possible compositional plot for this 
movement. However, he does not develop the content of that plot any further. He only 
claims that the oppositions between high and low styles, between sacred and profane, 
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and between the spontaneity of aria and the self-consciousness of learned style 
constitute an attractive framework for a plot. ‘This helps to explain,’ Agawu writes, 
‘why a solemn motet for strings in a decidedly high style and infused with fantasy 
elements is suddenly interrupted by virtuoso display, then by a middle-style march, 
and then by a high-style dance (gavotte), and finally by the emergence of an operatic 
character’ (Agawu, 1991, 117). Nonetheless, Agawu notes that the listing of topics 
does not as such offer any explanation for the nature of Op. 132’s internal 
conjunctions, beyond the observation that the movement is marked by contrast and a 
plurality of topical references (ibid., 116). Rather, he suggests that 
 
we need to acknowledge the inadequacy of topics as ontological signs, and replace 
that formulation with structuralist notions of arbitrary signs, for it seems clear that 
even those listeners for whom the referential elements are real and substantive would 
agree that the individual gestures derive their importance less from their paradigmatic 
or associative properties than from their syntagmatic or temporal ones. For if the 
relationships between phenomena determine their nature rather than any intrinsic 
aspect of the phenomena themselves, then it is to the domain of absolute diachrony 
that we must turn. (Agawu 1991, 117.) 
 
Ultimately, Agawu concludes that the surface does not signify anything coherent. 
However, he does not see the piece as disunified, as he finds continuity on the 
subsurface level. Agawu’s concepts of the unity of the subsurface will be developed 
further in Chapter 4. 
 
McClary’s view 
 
Susan McClary (2000) bases her view of the first movement of Beethoven’s Op. 132 
largely on Agawu’s (1991). She draws upon his insights, but continues from where he 
left off reaching far more controversial conclusions. McClary argues that Agawu 
‘reads the exposition as a random assortment of topoi littering the surface; and 
although he carefully classifies them all according to traditional associations, he 
decides ultimately that they do not signify anything coherent’ (McClary 2000, 119–
21). According to her own Adorno-inspired view, ‘[f]ew pieces offer so vivid an 
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image of shattered subjectivity as the opening page of Op. 132’ (ibid., 119). 
Moreover, she writes: 
 
In contrast to typical sonata movements, which pursue the activities of a principal 
theme, this one presents within its first key area four radically contrasting ideas, 
differentiated not only by melodic contour but by the worlds to which they would 
seem to refer—if, indeed, reference can be said to be operative any longer. (McClary 
2000, 119.) 
 
The four worlds the four ideas are said to refer to are, in order of appearance, ‘the 
Renaissance motet, the virtuoso solo cadenza/recitative, the pathos-ridden aria, and 
the march.’ In addition, the transition adds a dance (McClary 2000, 121–2). Thus, as 
Hatten (2004, 272) points out, McClary identifies the topics slightly differently 
compared to Agawu. If bar 11 for Agawu represented march, McClary sees it as aria, 
while the march, in McClary’s interpretation, begins only in bar 15. McClary argues 
that the affective devices embedded in all these snippets draw on a long history of 
shared codes: ‘[T]he twisting minor chords, yearning sevenths, ambiguous diminished 
chords, distorted Neapolitan inflections, appoggiaturas, and suspensions that make up 
the surface all belong to the most agonized corner of an affective palette that descends 
from the Renaissance madrigal’ (McClary 2000, 122). 
 
McClary bases her view of Op. 132 partly on an interpretation offered by Joseph 
Kerman in an early essay on the piece (Kerman 1952, 32–55, referred to in McClary 
2000, 119–138). She claims to propose ‘a kind of reconciliation between Kerman’s 
humanist interpretation and Agawu’s formal analysis’ (ibid., 119). Contrary to 
Agawu, Kerman, according to McClary, ‘prefers to interpret the surface as signifying, 
even if the process he traces borders on incoherence’ (McClary 2000, 121). ‘For it 
surely cannot be coincidental,’ McClary writes, ‘that the tattered signifiers that parade 
by in confusion in this movement refer to the most readily recognized, the most 
privileged of genre-types’ (ibid.). As McClary further notes: ‘What emerges from this 
collage of deracinated, apparently unrelated topoi is at least a consistent tone 
described by Kerman as “suffering.” We may not be able to make immediate sense of 
the succession of events in Op. 132, but we can at least recognize the signs of 
anguish’ (ibid., 122). Concerned with conventions as she is, McClary further notes: 
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In other words, if Beethoven does everything within his power to shred conventions 
as he goes, he can proceed only by means of those very conventions. He calls up 
moments of an orderly social world, with its religious rituals, dances, military 
exercises, lyric songs, and modes of virtuosic display, even though his collage 
destabilizes their meanings. We may be witnessing the rantings of a madman who has 
lost the ability to forge articulate meanings, or a nightmare in which warped 
fragments of the everyday appear as though randomly shuffled, or a level of 
interiority that refuses to marshall its impulses into the tidy wrappers of eighteenth-
century form. … Nowhere in this quartet do we find unmediated expression. 
(McClary 2000, 122.) 
 
McClary notes that structural unfolding often serves as the key to these kind of 
inchoate openings, ‘especially during this period when the act of “becoming” figures 
so prominently in cultural agendas’ (McClary 2000, 122). In the same way that the 
Eroica began with little more than a snippet and gradually earned a sustainable 
identity by annexing whatever it encountered, McClary suggests we might presume 
reconciliation between the heterogeneous elements in Opus 132 and anticipate that the 
conflicted beginning will have achieved coherent articulation by the end of the 
movement. As McClary writes: 
 
the exposition’s second theme not only presents a balanced instance of what seems a 
full-fledged entity [bar 48] … but proceeds to start annexing into its affirmative 
context the snippets from the opening section: the erratic sixteenth notes of what 
Kerman calls a scream become the means for directed forward motion, the march 
rhythms lend decisiveness, and the tortured intervals of the motet now contribute only 
the signs of yearning that the sensitive bourgeois subject must possess. Yet at the last 
moment of the exposition, the fusion falls apart. (McClary 2000, 123.) 
 
Although the fusion is told to fall apart, McClary still suggests a variety of ways in 
which we may make sense of the movement. Among other things, she suggests we 
might seek the help of Fredric Jameson who theorizes about the schizophrenic 
postmodern subject, in which the surface that used to be guaranteed by a sense of 
underlying depth has become mere surface for the inconsequential playing with 
signs—that is an open and honest travesty of the title of Agawu’s book (McClary 
2000, 125). McClary stresses that John Cage is a crucial figure for Jameson’s 
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argument, in that Cage retains external form but fills it with whatever his chance 
operations happen to yield. ‘In fact, we might imagine a piece by Cage that would 
produce something like the first page of Op. 132 through the random switching of a 
radio dial. Yet surely Beethoven—even Beethoven in extremis—is not Cage,’ 
McClary concludes (ibid.). Instead, she turns to Kerman, who suggests that 
Beethoven’s ruptured surface produces ‘a carefully calculated effect’ and that 
‘Beethoven is employing those particular signs and procedures for reasons that will 
eventually become intelligible’ (ibid.). Following Kerman’s idea of the beginning of 
the Great Fugue as constituting a ‘table of contents’ for the rest of the movement, 
McClary argues that the whole first movement of Op. 132 can be heard as ‘three 
rough drafts of such a table’ (ibid., 124). The first draft on the first page includes all 
the ingredients of the quartet as a whole. As McClary puts it: 
 
Beethoven designs this opening in such a way as to deflect forward the listener’s 
desire to witness the consolidation of meaning, away from the typically autonomous 
first movement and toward the series of movements that follows. And here we find 
each of the associative shards introduced in the first section now expanded into a full-
blown articulation: first, the dance and affirmative lyrical elements [second 
movement], then the sacred motet with the Heiliger Dankgesang [third movement], 
next a march interrupted by recitative [fourth movement], and at last a finale marked 
with the singing pathos of the fragment that emerged as the anchor of movement I. 
(McClary 2000, 128–9.) 
 
Furthermore, McClary (2000, 129) suggests yet another way in which we might make 
sense out of the first movement of Op. 132: ‘If the topoi of the introduction seemed an 
arbitrary assortment, like shuffled tarot cards, they begin to become meaningful when 
each becomes a whole episode arranged within a linear sequence.’ Following 
Kerman, McClary suggests the sequence represents a kind of journey: 
Along with Kerman, I hear this sequence as representing something of a journey—
though emphatically not the always-already guaranteed journey to Utopia of the 
standard tonal process, best exemplified by Beethoven’s own middle period. If there 
is heroicism in Op. 132, it manifests itself not in the triumph of identity (the story 
sonata and tonality tend to tell, left to their own devices), but in the fact that its 
implied persona embraces each of its topical realms in turn, finds that no single one 
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provides a satisfactory answer, and eventually attempts to forge an ending even 
though closure itself—along with unconflicted identity—has been acknowledged as 
vanity. If the subject of Op. 132 is not the unified tune of the Eroica but rather that 
tangle of contradictory impulses revealed on the opening page, then this process is 
perhaps an ideal way of telling its story while preserving its peculiar form of identity. 
To reconcile the antinomies would be to destroy what is fundamental to this particular 
subject. (McClary 2000, 129.) 
 
In both Agawu’s and McClary’s readings, the surface is ultimately seen as disunified. 
Although meaning exists through topical signification and the surface refers to places 
both within and outside the work, the surface is considered both ruptured and 
incoherent. Unity is sought through other aspects of the music, which will be treated 
in detail in the following chapters. 
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3. Unity of form 
 
This chapter is concerned with arguments about form in Beethoven’s Op. 132, first 
movement, as presented by Kofi Agawu (1991), Robin Wallace (1989), Daniel Chua 
(1995), Susan McClary (2000), and Frank Samarotto (2009). The problems that will 
be addressed include sonata form as a formal framework, formal boundaries and 
form-defining moments, the problem of the ‘double returns,’ the structural ambiguity 
of the form, and Schenkerian Urlinie as a form-defining feature. Agawu (1991, 118) 
notes that Beethoven makes certain representations toward sonata form although the 
form is never normatively enacted. Wallace (1989, 9) suggests that Beethoven might 
have deliberately played upon a certain structural ambiguity inherent in the form he 
created. Both Chua (1995) and Samarotto (2009) approach the movement through the 
notion of a Schenkerian descent to ⌃2 typical of sonata form movements. Finally, 
Susan McClary (2000) offers an open-ended model according to which the form of 
the first movement is comprised of fragments that will be developed over the course 
of the quartet as a whole. 
 
A few landmarks should be pointed out in the overall form of Op. 132, first 
movement: The quartet begins with a slow introduction in bars 1–8, followed by the 
first theme starting in bar 10. The transition begins in bar 23, while bar 48 brings 
about the second theme in F major. The development section begins in bar 75. Bar 92 
has constituted a major problem for Adorno-influenced scholars who have seen it as 
an aporia or a moment of emptiness or absence (Chua 1995, 98; Spitzer 2006). The 
most prominent formal problem concerns the two returns of opening material, in bars 
103 and 193, respectively. Which one of these represents the true recapitulation? In 
bar 103, opening material is exclaimed in the dominant minor, E minor. In bar 193, 
the opening material appears in the tonic, A minor. One final focal point remains, bar 
232, from where the coda begins. 
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Sonata form as formal framework 
 
Agawu notes that the ‘rhetorical process, the argument of this movement … is 
conducted within the framework of sonata form’ (Agawu 1991, 118). However, 
Agawu states that we should be aware that both sonata form and the beginning–
middle–ending paradigm achieve their explanatory power ‘more negatively than 
positively.’ That is, it is the departure from a normative enactment of sonata form, or 
from the use of material conventionally symbolizing beginning, middle or ending that 
constitute the key characteristic of the movement. (Ibid.) Agawu writes: 
 
These divergences in the reading of the formal layout arise out of certain 
representations that Beethoven makes toward sonata form—representations that are, 
however, never normatively enacted. By virtue of the aria in F major alone, one can 
rightly speak of a second subject or, more properly, of a second key area, just as one 
can speak confidently of a recapitulation, since material presented earlier in A minor 
and F major is reconciled in the reappearance of A minor (with a touch of A major) 
later on. On the other hand, the appearance of the thematic substance of the A minor 
and F major areas in the middle of the movement in E minor and C major 
respectively [bars 103 ff] disrupts the normative gesture of sonata form, and 
embarrasses both the analyst who sees it as a thematic but not a harmonic 
recapitulation, and the one who sees it as a mere development—the former because 
the harmonic environment makes nonsense of any notion of a recapitulation, and the 
latter because such a wholesale restatement is uncharacteristic of a genuine 
development section. (Agawu 1991, 118.)  
 
Ultimately, Agawu decides to go for an interpretation of sonata form as a ‘signifying 
model against the backdrop of a harmonically-defined process’: 
The questions of two expositions versus one development, two developments versus 
one exposition, or one exposition versus two recapitulations need not detain us 
further, because the issue will never be settled. Indeed a search for the “truth” may 
not lie with those analysts anxious to distribute the reality of this movement into a 
sonata-form model, especially if conflict and lack of resolution are essential to late 
Beethoven. If we think of sonata form as a signifying model against the backdrop of a 
normative, harmonically-defined process, then the logic of Beethoven’s formal 
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strategy is at once evident. There is, first, a statement of contrasting premises (A 
minor and F major), then a prolongation of the resulting conflict (E minor, C major, 
and others), and finally a resolution (A minor/A major/A minor). It may therefore be 
argued that it is unimportant how one chooses to label the individual sections of the 
movement, so long as one grasps the logic of tonal relations. (Agawu 1991, 118–120.) 
 
An undecided form – a deliberate choice 
 
Robin Wallace proposes another possible explanation for the dilemma of the overall 
form. In the first movement of Op. 132, Wallace (1989, 9) finds a ‘structural 
peculiarity which many commentators have observed, but none has adequately 
resolved’. Wallace thinks of the movement as having ‘two unique and self-sufficient 
recapitulations: the first beginning in the dominant, E minor [bar 103], and proceeding 
through the mediant, C major, while the second begins in the tonic, A minor [bar 
193], and proceeds through the tonic major, A major’ (ibid.). Instead of trying to 
resolve the issue of which of these sections is the ‘true’ recapitulation, Wallace 
proposes a solution in the form of a question, which forms the basic argument for his 
whole article: 
 
might not Beethoven, in this movement, have deliberately played upon the structural 
ambiguity inherent in the form which he created, in order to impress the listener with 
the possibility of divergent expressive interpretations? (Wallace 1989, 9.) 
 
Wallace goes on to account for the many ambiguities he finds in the movement and 
comes up with a few important remarks: there is the ‘obvious conflict between the 
rival recapitulations,’ there is the tonal plan of the movement, which ‘vacillates 
constantly between minor and major keys before concluding resolutely with a march-
like section in A minor.’ (Wallace 1989, 9–10.) Moreover, there is the opposition of 
the pleading first theme and the relaxed, lyrical second theme—‘perhaps a deliberate 
exaggeration for rhetorical purposes of the sort of contrast which by this time had 
become fairly standard in sonata form.’ (Ibid.) Wallace still notes one ambiguity 
concerning the tonality of the movement, which ‘in a very real sense … is in A major 
[as well as A minor]’ (ibid., 11). This ambiguity will be treated more in detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Bar 92 – a climactic ‘nothing’ 
 
Speaking about a moment in bar 92, Daniel Chua (1995, 88) notes the following on 
the function of the development section, starting in bar 74: 
 
It is, so to speak, an ‘anti-development,’ no longer working out its material 
powerfully towards the recapitulation; rather, there is an internal fracturing of form: 
the crisis of contrast is pressed to the breaking point until it negates itself in 
seemingly contingent gestures. At its very climax the development arrives at a state 
of aporia, quite literally a moment of ‘real absence,’ as the music empties itself: in 
bar 92 there is silence. (Chua 1995, 88.) 
 
For Chua, the poignancy of this climactic ‘nothing’ is perhaps most sharply felt 
through Schenkerian sensibilities. According to Chua, it is precisely at the moment of 
the penultimate step ⌃3 of the alleged Schenkerian descent that there is ‘a lacuna, a 
blank, followed by something that is absurd not only in its inversion of expectations 
but in its denial of the melodic pitch C’ (Chua 1995, 90, see Example 1). For Chua, it 
is not enough that the music is momentarily in the key of C, nor is it enough to assert 
⌃3 through the C in the bass (bars 92 ff). He cannot find the ⌃3 from where the descent 
to ⌃2 would start. As Chua notes, ‘at a critical point in the form a structural pillar is 
removed, and Schenkerian theory is faced with kenosis—an absence thrown into relief 
by the extremity of the gestural contrast’ (ibid.). 
 
 
 
Example 1. Chua’s illustration of the ‘missing’ ⌃3 in the development of Op. 132 
(Chua 1995, 90). 
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Bar 103 – a shocking moment 
 
A few bars later, in bar 103, another form-defining moment comes with the extensive 
repetition of opening material in E minor, the minor-mode dominant of the home key. 
How should this be interpreted: Is it part of an ongoing development or is it a 
recapitulation of some kind? Frank Samarotto (2009, 19) describes the moment as a 
‘shockingly violent gesture for this work’s relatively muted rhetoric.’ Samarotto 
continues by saying: 
 
It is as if the persistence of the slow introduction into the Allegro suddenly takes on 
an aggressively active character, as if the languid sostenuto [the character of the 
opening bars] concealed a darker, more forceful side. Thus it is not enough to begin 
the development with a recreation of the opening material in its pianissimo and legato 
guise [bar 74]; this is soon dismissed. The hesitant continuations of mm. 74 and 92 
are replaced by the opening motto stated as emphatically as possible: the whole 
quartet in triple octaves beginning fortissimo [bar 103]. (Samarotto 2009, 19.) 
 
Samarotto (ibid.) concludes that ‘[w]hat follows [in bar 103] is famously called a 
restatement of the exposition transposed to E minor (with all the formal problems that 
entails), but it is not exactly that, and the differences are telling.’ According to 
Samarotto (ibid., 20), the passage in bars 103–118 recreates exactly the proportions of 
the opening Assai sostenuto, with a few differences. For instance, ‘it lacks the 
harmonic alternation of tonic and dominant, remaining insistently in E minor’ (ibid.). 
Also, ‘[t]he cadential drive in the previous bar [102] prepares us for the tonic of E 
minor. We get the leading tone instead, materially a dominant, but the fortissimo 
dynamic stresses it as an appoggiatura, conceptually replacing the tonic’ (ibid.). 
Finally, a ‘remarkable and far-reaching detail’ is found in bars 107–8: 
the tonic here is clearly E minor, but Beethoven reworks the figuration to restate the 
diminished-fourth motive … on its original pitches (save the Gn for the final G#), in its 
original register, and as if in its original key! Besides the extraordinary reach of the 
opening into this distant area, the recall of a motive so exactly allows a long-range 
connection between the C6 of the Kopfton [bar 21] … with B6 that represents the 
motion to ⌃2 and the interruption expected in sonata form [bar 131]. 
(Samarotto 2009, 20, original italics. See Example 2 and Example 6.) 
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Example 2. Voice-leading sketch overview of the entire first movement of  
Beethoven’s Op. 132 (Samarotto 2009, 25).  
 
 
An unresolved approach 
 
Susan McClary endorses a somewhat ambiguous and unresolved approach to the 
question of the form as a whole. She describes the passage starting in bar 103 as an 
‘extensive formal block that has caused much consternation among analysts. Because 
it rehearses the principal events of the opening section, it is often labelled a 
recapitulation—in fact, the first of two, because this very same sequence occurs yet 
again.’ (McClary 2000, 123.) She also notes a certain ambiguity already in Joseph 
Kerman’s writings on the passage: in his early essay (1952) Kerman treated the two 
blocks [starting in bar 103 and 193 respectively] as recapitulation and coda, though in 
his book on the Beethoven Quartets (1966) he endorsed the dual-recapitulation 
solution (McClary 2000, 124). McClary offers her own (re)solution to the problem of 
the recapitulation and coda versus dual-recapitulation model, and escapes through the 
back door in saying that 
 
It is, of course, both and neither of these options. What is important is that process 
itself has been thrown into confusion and thus hovers somewhere between refusing 
conventional structure altogether and obeying it so mechanically that the reiteration 
of reified formal blocks threatens to take precedence over the actual materials. I 
prefer to think of the movement as composed of three attempted expositions, each of 
which is discarded in preparation for the next. (McClary 2000, 124.) 
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Furthermore, McClary notes the following on the overall form of the movement: 
 
Fragments of all the materials that will be explored over the course of the whole 
quartet appear in this opening movement … Yet Beethoven does put these elements 
through the paces of sonata, as though this scrap heap itself constituted a traditional 
subject. And despite the radical dismemberment of the opening motto in the coda 
(each pitch appears in mm. 232–35 in a different instrument as a background pedal 
tone), he even presents us with “closure” of a sort: a rhythmically decisive cadence on 
the tonic, A minor, but with a fit of newly spawned violin figuration that seems 
designed as a means of insisting (however irrationally) that this is the end, goddamn 
it! (McClary 2000, 124–5.) 
 
For Samarotto, the question of the overall form of the movement is equally a question 
about closure, as he notes the following towards the end: 
 
It is late in the piece, not long to go, and the form has not been settled, not for the 
listener and not for the piece. The question is one of closure. It is not that we have not 
had enough of it (perhaps requiring an emphatic coda?)—we have not had any of it. 
… The piece is acting out a pantomime of sonata form, but its inner conflicts do not 
allow it to believe in its substance. (Samarotto 2009, 22.) 
 
What Samarotto means by this statement is explained, more precisely, a few 
paragraphs later: 
 
The movement does close with strongly material representatives of tonic and 
dominant, but with a conviction that seems to extend only to local events. The overall 
form is somehow represented, but the form as a whole is not satisfyingly 
consummated. This is because the stuff on which the form is grounded is itself 
conflicted to its core. It is not enough to say that the design simulates some possible 
sonata scheme. The material that informs it does not have the conviction to support 
that scheme. (Samarotto 2009, 23.) 
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And at last Samarotto concludes: 
 
This extraordinary movement, teetering at the edge of coherence, is obsessed with its 
inner tensions at all levels, forming a unity not of motives or formal schemes but of 
inner conflicts which it cannot resist—an uneasy unity of dividedness. 
(Samarotto 2009, 23.) 
 
In this chapter, we have witnessed a variety of attempts to make sense of the form of 
Beethoven’s Op. 132, first movement. No definite answers were presented. No all-
encompassing master narratives were unveiled. None of the writers denied the 
existence of sonata form, yet none pointed out definite correlations to specific parts of 
that scheme. Agawu offered a middle-of-the-road view of sonata form as a signifying 
model against the backdrop of a harmonically-defined process. Samarotto’s and 
Chua’s notions of the Schenkerian descent are rooted in a Schenkerian view of sonata 
form. McClary and Wallace stress the ambiguous in this movement by stating that 
process itself has been thrown into confusion (McClary 2000, 124) and that Beethoven 
deliberate plays on the structural ambiguity (Wallace 1989, 9). Samarotto’s 
concluding view of the large-scale form is both honest and apt: the piece is inevitably 
in some kind of sonata form, although the material that informs it is too conflicted to 
support that scheme. 
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4. Unity of subsurface 
 
This chapter is concerned with issues of subsurface, tonality and background in Op. 
132, first movement. I will present Agawu’s (1991) notion of subsurface continuity 
through the circle of fifths, Wallace’s (1989) considerations on the Urlinie including 
his notion of major–minor oscillation, Samarotto’s (2009) considerations on tonal 
stability, and, finally, McClary’s (2000) notion of F major as the symbolic Never 
Never Land for Beethoven. Samarotto will perhaps be treated in greater detail than the 
others due to his detailed account of the underlying harmonic structures. Inevitably, 
this chapter is also concerned with issues of form and motivic features insofar as they 
concern the tonality of the movement—for instance, the discussion about Wallace 
deals largely with issues of form. Over the course of this chapter, I will explore to 
what extent these theories of subsurface continuity grant coherence to the piece. 
 
Agawu’s scuba diving and circle of fifths 
 
Susan McClary (2000, 121) has humorously noted that Kofi Agawu—faced with the 
dismembered surface of Op. 132’s first movement—‘dives below the wreckage of the 
surface in hopes of discovering continuity at a deeper level.’ Agawu does indeed find 
continuity on a deeper level, but it is not the kind of continuity that would grant the 
piece coherence in every respect; rather, it is a relative coherence which compensates 
for the radical discontinuity of the surface. Agawu argues that 
 
a familiar construct … —the circle of fifths—may be shown to underlie the harmonic 
process of the entire movement, cutting across the obvious points of formal 
articulation and lending the whole process a subsurface continuity. 
(Agawu 1991, 120–1.) 
 
Beginning with A, the movement travels through five cycles of the circle. As Agawu 
(1991, 121) notes, ‘each cycle is … defective—there is no enactment of the ideal.’ 
The starting points for each cycle coincide with formally significant points, but the 
selection of notes seems somewhat arbitrary. Agawu (ibid.) contends that 
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‘[s]pecifically, three, then one, then four, then two, and then, again, two steps are 
omitted from the respective cycles. … All seven possible points are occurrent, 
although not in any one cycle.’ Example 3 shows Agawu’s account of the more or less 
coherent circles of fifths. It may be argued that dealing with such vague 
representations of the circle of fifths questions the whole theory. For Agawu, the 
listener’s familiarity with the construct, however, serves to guarantee its perceptual 
significance: 
 
With each point of entry into the world of harmonic syntax in the first movement of 
Beethoven’s Op. 132, we have encountered either an obstacle or a signficant [sic] 
absence [in the form of defective or incomplete circles of fifths]. …  The business of 
defective cycles continues to underscore the significance of instability, lack of 
completion, and perhaps even lack of unity. For although—to take the circle of fifths 
as an example—there is never a complete journey through its span, familiarity with 
the construct serves to guarantee its perceptual significance, making the notions of 
ideal and defective purely theoretical phenomena. (Agawu 1991, 121.) 
 
Agawu further suggests that the relationship between the domains, between surface 
and subsurface, ‘is one of disjunction, a disjunction whose rhetorical force transcends 
the normative disjunction between domains that lies at the heart of every expressive 
structure’ (ibid., 121). I quote Agawu’s description of this condition of disjunction 
between domains, as he notes that his analysis has shown 
 
that the varied, highly contrasted, even apparently disjunct topical discourse that 
characterizes the surface of the movement contrasts sharply with the high level of 
continuity in harmonic process. There are no “bumps” in the latter, and where there 
are shortcuts, their articulation counters any feeling that something is inconsequential. 
(Agawu 1991, 121.) 
 
For the sake of brevity, I have chosen not to present any of Agawu’s numerous 
examples of instances where the surface and subsurface levels collide. Instead, it will 
suffice to note that the structural tension between the two domains is, in Agawu’s 
reading, perhaps most violent at the end of the movement, specifically in the last 
eleven measures, where Beethoven, according to Agawu (1991, 124–5), until the final 
bars, challenges senses of closure and ending. 
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Example 3. Agawu’s account of structural elements (circle of fifths) in 
Beethoven’s Op. 132, first movement (Agawu 1991, 119–20). 
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Wallace’s being in two keys 
 
Robin Wallace (1989) suggests an outline of the underlying, background bass line of 
Op. 132’s first movement (see Example 4). Wallace’s graphical presentation 
emphasises the opening cello motive ‘to show its structural significance’ and then 
provides a note-head for each important statement either of the opening theme of the 
Allegro section or of the contrasting theme (ibid., 10). Wallace argues that ‘[i]t is 
immediately evident that the key structure of the entire movement is a “composing 
out” of the F-E appoggiatura in the opening motive; this explains why the “first” 
recapitulation occurs in E minor, which may be heard as a resolution of the F major in 
which the contrasting theme was heard at its first appearance in the exposition.’ 
(Ibid.) However, as Wallace notes 
 
What is particularly remarkable … is that the ‘second’ recapitulation of the main 
theme which begins at m. 193 … receives no background emphasis; this is not an 
arbitrary decision on my part, but reflects the fact that the theme is nowhere 
harmonized with a structurally significant A-minor triad. (Wallace 1989, 10.) 
 
 
Example 4. Background bass line of Op. 132, first movement (Wallace 1989, 10). 
 
Thus, Wallace (ibid., 11) concludes that far from being a harmonic recapitulation, this 
‘second’ recapitulation (bar 193) is ‘simply a contrapuntal development of the two 
main themes of the movement.’ For Wallace, the ‘true’ return of the tonic, then, 
occurs with the restatement of the second theme in A major beginning in bar 223 
(ibid.). Wallace suggests it is insufficient to account for the voice-leading layout of 
the movement with a normative interrupted ⌃5–⌃1 Urlinie descent in A minor. Rather, 
he suggests we must provide an alternative reading of the Urlinie in order to 
adequately explain this play with A major in bar 223 (see Example 5). Wallace further 
explains: 
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As can be seen, this reading yields an Urlinie which follows an unambiguous and 
uninterrupted descent from 5 to 1, but which includes C-sharp, not C-natural, as the 
third degree. A striking cross-relation is thus established with the structural C-natural 
in the bass which underlies the statement of the contrasting theme in the ‘first’ 
recapitulation [bar 103 ff.]. More important, however, is the fact that if we accept this 
reading, then it must appear that Beethoven contradicts the explicit tonality of the 
movement by having the background descend through a major key, giving the C-
sharp in m. 223 a structural significance that far transcends its context, and justifies 
the extreme care which Beethoven takes in preparing and harmonizing this note. To 
the ambiguities already observed in this movement may thus be added one which 
concerns its very tonality: it appears to be in A minor, but in a very real sense it is in 
A major as well. (Wallace 1989, 11.) 
 
Wallace argues that this second appearance of the contrasting theme in A major 
becomes the ‘key to the form of the entire movement’ (ibid., 14). ‘Beethoven thus 
challenges the listener to reverse his or her conceptions of the relative significance of 
A minor and major, and of the meaning of the half-step relationship C/C-sharp’ (ibid., 
14–15). 
 
 
Example 5. Wallace’s alternative Urlinie reading: uninterrupted descent from 
5 to 1 (Wallace 1989, 12). 
 
Moreover, Wallace adds an argument which has received little emphasis by the other 
writers, that is an argument of expression and emotional content. Wallace states that 
‘[t]he second theme, relatively insignificant at the foreground level, has become the 
focal point for the expressive background. … Even more important is the fact that in 
this movement the expressive and structural elements do not conflict; they are literally 
one and the same.’ (Ibid., 15.) Wallace states that the complexity of the emotional 
content ‘makes it unlikely that two listeners will hear the music in exactly the same 
manner,’ and that Beethoven, therefore, perhaps in Op. 132 at least, ‘chose to 
capitalize on this fact by making the music deliberately ambiguous in as many ways 
as possible’ (ibid., 15–16). Furthermore, Wallace concludes that the unique content of 
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Op. 132’s first movement is an assertion that an emotional message—although 
impossible to objectively verify—is nevertheless significant and may generate 
‘strength and assurance rather than confusion’ (ibid., 16–17). 
 
This is the important lesson of Wallace’s: in spite of its deliberately ambiguous form, 
there is something in the first movement of Beethoven’s Op. 132 generating ‘strength 
and assurance rather than confusion.’ It is a matter of making sense of the irrational. 
Also, strength and assurance refer to stability and clarity of thought, qualities that 
stand in sharp contrast with, for instance, Agawu’s emphasis on conflicts and 
irresolvable dilemmas. Moreover, I find it remarkable that Wallace writes of the 
second theme as ‘relatively insignificant,’ for as we shall see now, the second theme 
is not at all seen as that insignificant by writers such as Samarotto and McClary, even 
at the foreground level. 
 
Samarotto and the temporary resolution 
 
Samarotto (2009, 23) notes that ‘the stuff on which the form is grounded is itself 
conflicted to its core’ and that the material that informs the sonata scheme, therefore, 
‘does not have the conviction to support it’. I will now explore the basis for 
Samarotto’s argument and account for the tonal tensions which, in Samarotto’s view, 
make up for the main conflict of Op. 132’s first movement. Samarotto will be treated 
in greater detail than the other writers hitherto. 
 
According to Samarotto, the work’s musical language is notoriously simplistic 
featuring unusually conservative tonal materials. He states that this movement is 
‘arguably Beethoven’s most thoroughgoing essay in the art of problematizing the 
simplest of tonal relations and of discovering in them hitherto unexplored worlds’ 
(Samarotto 2009, 2). At the core of Samarotto’s reading lies the idea of a divided 
tonic, ‘a tonic conflicted against itself, undermined by its equivocal presentation.’ A 
similar internal conflict is found in the motion of the work’s phrase rhythm, and in 
our perception of the movement’s basic temporality. Samarotto argues that ‘[t]he 
conflict is brought full circle—but not resolved—in its contradictory realization of 
sonata form.’ (ibid.) 
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Samarotto notes that the situation with Op. 132 is ‘exquisitely subtle’ as regards the 
opening tonic that constitutes the foundation on which a Classical piece stands: ‘there 
is no question of a tonic presence—indeed, the turn away from the tonic key at the 
very end of m. 29 is jarringly forceful—yet actual manifestations of an opening tonic 
are maddeningly elusive, compromised at every turn’ (ibid., 3). Samarotto goes on to 
list a number of instances of this compromised tonic on the opening page and 
concludes that ‘[a]ll this equivocation leaves one with a sort of cognitive dissonance: 
the stable ground of tonic is somehow there but at every turn eludes our grasp’ 
(ibid., 4). 
 
A central piece of argument for Samarotto is the division between conceptuality and 
materiality in music. This also explains the absence of any materialisation of the tonic 
on the opening page: ‘It is so commonplace to refer to music being in a key,’ 
Samarotto writes, ‘that it is easy to forget how abstract this claim is. The sense that a 
tonic key or tonic prolongation pervades moments where no tonic is present is highly 
conceptual, a thing of the mind rather than of actual sound. This in no way negates the 
power of this idea; it simply points to a possible tension between the sonic experience 
and our comprehension of it.’ (Samarotto 2009, 4.) Samarotto argues that we 
normally expect a balance between our conceptual sense of key and its material 
representatives. However, the discrepancy between these two elements becomes 
particularly severe when the prolonged harmony that serves as the structural anchor of 
an entire movement must be assumed but its manifestations in sounds are not nearly 
commensurate with its importance. ‘In these situations we experience a tension 
between our conceptual sense of a tonic’s structural superiority and the inability to 
latch onto a secure material presence.’ (Ibid., 4–5.) 
 
Furthermore, Samarotto presents us with a voice-leading graph (Example 6) showing 
a conceptual tonic, placed in a separate bass staff, existing outside the sounding 
reality of the piece, but more ‘hidden in the cracks than filling the background’ 
(ibid., 10). ‘The surface,’ he claims, ‘is dominated by jagged unfoldings, pairings 
isolated from each other, out of which two continuities seek realization’ (ibid.). 
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Example 6. Voice-leading sketch of Beethoven’s Op. 132, first movement,  
bars 1–48 (Samarotto 2009, 12–13). 
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The first continuity is a rising stepwise bass, scarcely recognizable on its first pass, 
but crystallized into a whole by the explicit statement in bars 15–21. The second is the 
emerging diminished fourth in the top voice in bars 5–6, ‘an almost-lyrical moment of 
tonic assertion that collapses before it can stabilize’ (ibid.). According to Samarotto, 
the first two systems of Example 6 each show an attempt to reach ⌃3 undergirded by 
similar stepwise basses, and they look very much like two versions of the same 
material. However, he notes: 
 
What is remarkable is that these two systems depict disparate passages that should 
function quite differently: the Assai sostenuto, presumably serving as a slow 
introduction, and the first sixteen bars of the Allegro, presumably acting as a thematic 
exposition. Indeed, the bassline of the introduction only completes itself six bars into 
the Allegro, coming to rest on a structural V. The formal divisions are as blurred as 
the formal functions are ambiguous. Under the domain of the divided tonic, the 
clarity that would set these apart is not possible; all is clouded by this sub rosa 
conflict. (Samarotto 2009, 10–11.) 
 
Continuing on the theme of conceptuality versus materiality, Samarotto describes the 
opening page of Op. 132’s first movement with the following words: 
 
An acute tension between conceptuality and materiality finds an … exquisite 
expression in Op. 132’s opening movement. Here the celebrated Urmotiv embodied 
in the first four notes must be considered beyond its face value as a pitch series 
performing some unifying function (and a vague and general one, at that). Quite the 
opposite: its tonal function is highly divisive, and carefully crafted as such. 
(Samarotto 2009, 5.) 
 
According to Samarotto, the cello’s G#–A–F–E fragments the tonic chord into its 
component root and fifth, ‘each placed in a weak metric position by the dissonant 
element that precedes and displaces it’ (ibid., 5). Samarotto suggests that this is best 
interpreted through Schenker’s technique of unfolding, in which intervals 
conceptually heard as sounding together are separated in time, unfolded into a 
melodic sequence (ibid.). As Samarotto’s example shows (Example 7), the tonic is 
compromised by the harmonization of E by the viola’s G#. This V could stand as 
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prolongation of I; however, Samarotto suggests the opening G# draws us towards 
hearing a prolonged dominant throughout this motive, raising the possibility of an 
entirely illusory tonic, ‘one that slips from our grasp no sooner than we hear it’ 
(ibid., 6). ‘Of course,’ Samarotto fatefully states, ‘since this motive reappears with 
notorious frequency throughout this movement, this specially contrived unfolding, 
with all the conflict it embodies, dominates the discourse, and undermines everything’ 
(ibid.). Moreover: ‘Does one hear an overbearing V that resolves into a weak-beat 
tonic (in m. 6, only to collapse a moment later) or does one insist on tonic simply 
because one must, against all experience? Neither alternative fully captures this 
particular divided tonic.’ (ibid.) 
 
 
Example 7. Harmonization of the motif in the opening of Op. 132 
(Samarotto 2009, 7). 
 
In an attempt to go more into detail with the tonal ambiguity of the four-note cell, 
Samarotto investigates the G#–A–B–C line, which he claims ‘struggles to emerge’ in 
the opening Assai sostenuto passage. ‘However hypothetical, this actual line emerges 
in the first violin in m. 5,’ he writes (Samarotto 2009, 6). Furthermore, he states, the 
filled-in diminished fourth presents us with the possibility of a tonic divided in its 
prolongational allegiance. ‘Since it is not in and of itself a harmonic interval, this 
diminished fourth admits of at least two tonal interpretations: The G# can be a 
neighbor note to the tonic expression A–C or C can be an auxiliary pitch to the 
dominant’s G#–B.’ (Ibid., 8.) As Samarotto further notes, ‘we see inscribed in this 
diminished fourth the divided tonic engaged in an ongoing discourse of uneasy 
internal conflict’ (ibid.). 
 
Samarotto (2009, 8) goes on to show how the first appearance of the diminished 
fourth is ‘febrile but tentative, its tonic harmonization weak and uncertain’ (Example 
8c); then comes the first strained attempt at a primary theme (Example 8d); then an 
appearance that ‘supplies a stronger thematic statement’ (Example 8e); the stepwise 
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motion in the bass ‘casts doubt on the stability of m. 16’s tonic’ (Example 8f); 
Example 8g ‘stumbles’ onto the diminished-fourth motive, ‘and by mighty transfers it 
back to the highest register only to be undercut by a dominant bass’; the theme’s 
consequent statement is overridden by the first violin’s F–E (Example 8h); in bar 31, 
the diminished fourth is ‘abruptly transposed’ and its expansion into a tritone 
‘provides a way out of miasma’ (Example 8i); last, the second theme, in bar 48, 
‘finally realizes this motive in a stable form, not only filling in a perfect fourth but 
clarifying that fourth as a third, F–A and a neighboring Bb’ (Example 8j). As 
Samarotto notes at the end, ‘[t]he ubiquitous conflict of the diminished fourth is here 
ameliorated, but only in a key removed from tonic stability.’ (Ibid.) 
 
 
Example 8. Appearances of the diminished fourth in Beethoven’s Op. 132,  
first movement (Samarotto 2009, 9). 
 
As we have seen, Samarotto approaches the question of unity on the subsurface level 
primarily through issues of tonic stability. At the core of his argumentation lies the 
idea of the divided tonic being conceptually present from the very beginning, but 
rarely if ever materialised in a tonic triad. The tonic is undermined by its equivocal 
presentation and actual manifestations are ‘maddeningly elusive’ (Samarotto 2009,  
2–3). The problem of the divided tonic becomes particularly evident in the case of the 
diminished fourth, which allows for two alternative tonal interpretations: the four-note 
cell can be rooted either in tonic or dominant. For Samarotto, ‘the resolution of the 
diminished fourth’s tonal problem occurs not toward the end of the piece, but within 
the second theme, and is temporary’ (Samarotto 2009, 8–9, n14, my emphasis). 
 35  
Samarotto’s emphasis on the resolution of conflict with the second theme is neither 
extraordinary nor surprising when we look to his other remarks about the second 
theme: he talks about the arrival of the second theme as a ‘transformation of … tense 
conflict into flowing lyricism’ (ibid., 16). Also, Samarotto notes that the accumulation 
of rhythmic energy in the preceding measures ‘is dissipated by coming full circle, to a 
transformation of itself, languidness become [sic] lyricism, in a foreign key that will 
not last’ (ibid., 17). 
 
F major as Never Never Land 
 
Finally, we may turn to Susan McClary for a concluding notion on the significance of 
F major as the key of the secondary theme area. McClary draws our attention to the 
fact that the ‘attempted synthesis’ between the heterogeneous elements of Op. 132 
takes place in that particular key. And she pleads to us to pay attention to the 
following: 
 
Note that the attempted synthesis takes place in F major, the sixth degree that 
increasingly stands for Never Never Land in the economy of ninetheeth-century 
musical imagery. In later Beethoven and, especially, Schubert, the submediant often 
substitutes for the too-conventional, too-rational dominant as the second key area. As 
a major-key area within a minor-key hierarchy, it variously radiates hope, escape, or 
nostalgia for a lost arcadia—indeed, it comes to invoke a sense of longing for the 
arcadia of the Enlightenment, even though the irrationality of such devices marks 
them as irrevocably alienated from the Edenic world of the previous generation. 
(McClary 2000, 123.) 
 
In this chapter, we have seen how different theories of subsurface continuity grant 
relative coherence to the present movement. Different writers place different 
emphases: Wallace and Agawu sought to understand the harmonic processes 
underlying the overall form. Samarotto paid most attention to a conceptual tonic 
underlying the movement, while also noting a ‘divided tonic’ manifested in a tonally 
unstable diminished-fourth motif. Agawu’s incomplete circle of fifths is a theoretical 
construct with severe defects, but nevertheless an attempt at making sense of the 
harmony on the subsurface level. Wallace’s idea of oscillation between major and 
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minor is equally an attempt at making sense of harmony and tonality on the 
subsurface level. More importantly, in Wallace’s view, the expressive and structural 
elements in the first movement of Op. 132 do not conflict; they are literally one and 
the same. For McClary and Samarotto, the secondary key area, the F major section, 
represented something of an oasis: McClary sees it as an attempted synthesis between 
heterogeneous elements, Samarotto finds that the inner tensions inherent in the quartet 
reach a temporary resolution here. However, the work retains tension which needs to 
be released. 
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5. Motivic unity 
 
It has already been noted that the four-note cell at the very beginning of Beethoven’s 
Op. 132, first movement, for some analysts, plays a significant role for shaping and 
perceiving unity in this movement. In this chapter, I will continue to explore the 
possibilities of motivic unity, albeit in a different fashion. Up till now, those writers 
who have argued for the coexistence of unifying and disunifying elements in this 
movement, have done so arguing that the elements belong to different domains: for 
instance, if the surface was seen as disrupted and disunified, there were elements on 
the subsurface level which granted relative coherence (Agawu). Now, in the case of 
Daniel Chua (1995), he presents us with unifying and disunifying elements within the 
very same domain: there are elements which simultaneously construct and deconstruct 
the score, he argues (Chua 1995, 80). Chua’s take on the unity–disunity issue is so 
special that I have devoted this entire chapter to his view. After a few general 
remarks, I will first present the constructing elements, then, the deconstructing ones. 
 
Chua argues that, in the first movement of Op. 132, unity and disunity, in fact, 
coexist. By simultaneously arguing for both unity and disunity, Chua places himself 
at both ends of the unity–disunity axis. Although heavily criticised, his book is a case 
in point in the way it, with an equally convincing tone, argues for the unity of the 
work as for the disunity of the same. Perhaps Chua, in the end, arrives at a view 
slightly more in favour of the disunified; nevertheless, he provides us with a valuable 
if strange account of the unifying elements of the piece, in particular, its motivic 
patchwork. For Chua, the key to interpretation is not ‘unity in diversity,’ but an 
‘impure mixture of seemingly immiscible elements—unity and disunity together’ 
(Chua 1995, 74–5, 83). 
 
For Chua, motivic integration is one of those ‘processes at work, which cause an 
entire piece to unfold with a logic that creates the peculiarities of the score’ (Chua 
1995, 5). Indeed, Chua notes that Beethoven ‘seems to play with a process of 
expanding a gesture, shape, or motivic complex into increasingly large structures that 
encapsulate one another, like a set of Russian dolls, until they fill out a form and even 
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an entire quartet’ (ibid.). However, in his attempt at a simultaneously constructive and 
deconstructive analysis, Chua also arrives at a point where he says there can be no 
systematic method of analysing Beethoven’s late quartets, since they constantly 
undermine analysis and challenge all analytical systems and analysts: ‘the analytical 
inadequacies will give way to ambiguities and impasses; harmonic logic will fail to 
connect, Schenker graphs will “warp” under the strain of demonstrating motivic 
structures … and motifs will be stretched out of recognition’ (ibid., 9). Chua partly 
blames the analyst and his analytical methods for not finding the supposed unity of 
the work, and it is by no means surprising that so many of Chua’s graphical 
presentations of motivic connectedness have become so warped. The pursuit of 
motivic connections is taken to such an extreme that the supposed connectedness 
becomes a merely, if not totally, theoretical phenomenon—often more conceptual 
than material, to borrow a concept from Samarotto. 
 
Turning to Adorno, Chua argues that these late works mark an inversion of technique 
or a negative moment in which the music alienates itself from its former logic. In 
middle-period Beethoven, a motif is defined with a rhythmic precision that enables it 
to retain its identity through the dynamic processes of harmonic transformation; 
therefore, Adorno regards the development sections of middle-period Beethoven as an 
allegory of individual freedom, with the motif generating itself within the external 
orders of an objective world, bearing traces of the utopian dream of a reconciliation 
between individual autonomy and abstract totality. In the late works, however, that 
dream is shattered, as the motif loses its identity, becoming abstract—not so much 
rhythmic definition as pitch structure. The former logic of Beethoven’s motivic 
process is destroyed, as it were, and Beethoven turns towards variation and 
counterpoint to animate forms. (Ibid., 73.) 
 
According to Chua, counterpoint and variation distort, if not erase, motivic identity. 
Examples of this are seen, for instance, in the third movement of Op. 132, the 
Heiliger Dankgesang, or in the late variation sets, where mottos, melodies and 
decoration are found in place of proper themes. In the late style, motifs become looser 
in construction, apt to manipulation, and motivic relationships become disjointed, as 
only one strand of identity is retained against a background of ever-changing 
parameters. (Ibid., 79–80.) Although Chua considers Op. 132 a quintessential 
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example of a work which can be reduced to ‘a motivic lattice … animated by 
variation and counterpoint,’ this is not an entirely unproblematic construct: 
 
In every dimension and on every level, the significance of the motif seemingly 
manufactures, with ineluctable logic, a structural unity, and autotelic object to be 
hewn from the score by avid structuralists. … But this motivic object, crystallized 
through analysis, is not an iconic representation of unity. The arcane contrapuntal 
texture and the thematic disguises of variation, far from clarifying motivic 
procedures, actually cloud their identity—the material becomes opaque, gnarled, 
difficult, and complex. What had formerly been a process for dynamic transformation 
becomes an agent for recondite expression and the creation of chaos. To claim that 
the fits and starts of the A minor Quartet make structural sense is to speak of unity 
and disunity in the same breath. And the unity is an esoteric one; disunity is at the 
forefront of consciousness. (Chua 1995, 74.) 
 
Constructing elements 
 
Chua largely bases his argumentation for the unity of the work on his numerous 
findings of the initial four-note cell that he claims appears in a variety of forms 
throughout the movement. Chua (1995, 58) states that both tonal and motivic 
coherence can easily be ‘culled’ from the score. ‘After all, structure in its barest 
essentials is stated from the start, as the contrapuntal artifice creates a lattice of 
interlocking motifs. What the cello announces in the opening bar is a pitch pattern 
which asserts itself as a source of motivic cohesion. … The motif counterpoints itself. 
Unity of a nepotistic kind is posited at the start.’ (Ibid., original emphasis.) Chua also 
notes that this four-note motif is one of Deryck Cooke’s ‘meta-motifs’ ‘that 
apparently spill over to unite all the late quartets’ (ibid., see also Cooke 1963). 
 
Chua presents us with a musical example which explains the motivic cohesion of the 
opening bars through prime forms, inversions, retrogrades, retrograde inversions and 
variants (Example 9). Chua (1995, 58) further argues that there is ‘something almost 
Webernesque about the way in which the atomistic idea is deployed symmetrically 
against itself, both simultaneously and in canon, in effect implying its own harmonic 
dialect of diminished inflections and appoggiaturas.’ ‘In this way,’ Chua writes, 
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‘harmonic progressions can be governed motivically even when the identity of the 
motif is obscured by variation … This is possible because these harmonic 
implications are already latent in the pitches of the motif itself … and these pitches 
can be superimposed as diminished harmonies, chained together and juxtaposed.’ 
(Ibid., 58–9.) 
 
 
Example 9. Chua’s account of variants of the motif in the first movement  
of Op. 132 (Chua 1995, 58). 
 
And there is more. Chua states that the motif is clearly ‘embedded in the melody of 
the first-subject group’ (Example 10a); ‘and although the second subject seems in 
such incongruous contrast to the mood and mode of the movement, the motif is there 
too, not only minimally in the chromatic inflections, but structurally in the melody 
and the bass’ (ibid., 62–3, see Example 10b). Chua argues that such structures ‘reflect 
a deeper unity of a functional nature’ (ibid., 63). He writes: 
 
Returning to the opening of the quartet, where contrast confronts structure, it is 
significant that the motif is there not only on the surface but as a scaffold, hidden by 
processes of variation and counterpoint. The polyphonic lattice of the opening is like 
a theme for variation, so that underlying the contrasts are unifying identities. 
(Chua 1995, 63.) 
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Example 10. Juxtaposition of motif and melody in the first (a) and second (b) 
groups in the first movement of Op. 132 (Chua 1995, 62–3). 
 
Chua also argues that the motif acquires a structural, form-defining role, as Beethoven 
‘employs the three different motivic configurations of the initial entries as structural 
signs, marking out [the beginning of] each section of the form’ (ibid., 67). See 
Example 11. 
 
Chua justifies his endless pursuit of motivic connectedness by referring to a kind of 
‘mono-motivic mania’ which is likely to captivate the analyst: 
 
Indeed, this quartet can easily promote a kind of mono-motivic mania in which the 
analyst is hypnotized by this pitch pattern in vertical, horizontal and contrapuntal 
formations. The motif is so omnipresent that it can be found in the most peculiar 
places, cropping up in a common-or-garden bass line … or tucked away in an 
insignificant inner voice … or caught in the middle of a phrase in a different mode 
and on a different beat …; it is even etched in the entries of the canonic transition. 
(Chua 1995, 60–1.) 
 
 42  
 
Example 11. Fugal entries as structural markers in the first movement  
of Op. 132 (Chua 1995, 68). 
 
Finally, although the score ‘is so saturated with motivic significance that it is 
impossible to isolate and explicate each one’ (ibid., 70), Chua offers a concluding 
remark on the significance of the motivic connectedness: 
 
the motivic gesture performs on all levels, from surface patterns to underlying 
structures; this results in a certain ambiguity when moving from one level to another, 
particularly if the pattern undergoes the internal transformations inherent from the 
start … so that the motif is not limited to strict retrogrades and inversions. … But the 
multitude of connections thrown up by the motivic density creates a flexibility which 
allows long-range links to be forged, so that ultimately [extreme contrasts] … can be 
bridged. (Chua 1995, 65.) 
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Elements of deconstruction 
 
Then, like a bolt from the blue sky, Chua’s essay turns around its own axis and argues 
for the disunity of the work. In Op. 132, Chua argues, ‘both these difficult forms of 
variation and counterpoint are at work, simultaneously constructing and 
de(con)structing the score. Beethoven creates this contradiction by setting parameters 
against one another, some building and others demolishing’ (ibid., 80). For Chua, the 
beginning of the coda (bar 232) marks just one example of a situation where the 
identity of the motif is severely questioned (Example 12). Beethoven places the motif 
in long notes against the melody of the Allegro, but this juxtaposition is hardly 
perceptible, for the counterpoint is distorted by radical processes of variation; 
‘although the motif is rhythmically and texturally intact, its identity is severely 
mangled by extreme registral dislocations as the pitches dart from stave to stave’ 
(ibid.). 
 
 
Example 12. The beginning of the coda, bar 232, where the identity of the motif 
is ‘severely questioned’ (Chua 1995, 80). 
 
At the start of the work, the process is even more complex. The opening polyphony 
has, according to Chua, all the marks of late-Beethovenian obscurity: ‘abstract and 
arcane, it forms a substructural grid of pitch patterns that will undergo variation 
procedures. But the processes of variation that follow do not define but distort the 
very structure they lean on. An act of violence is committed against unity itself.’ 
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(Ibid., 80–1.) However, at a moment of serious self-reflection, Chua comes up with 
one of his most crucial points, as he contemplates his ‘calligraphic patterns’: 
 
Is it not strange that they [the motivic graphs] deal only with pitches? They assume 
unity on the evidence of one parameter alone, despite the fact that the other 
parameters are deployed to destroy the very patterns of unity which the graphs 
emphasize. Even the simplest connection is fraught with difficulties. (Chua 1995, 81.) 
 
Chua exemplifies by referring to the beginning of the Allegro (bar 9, Example 13) and 
starts explaining: 
 
 
Example 13. Motivic (dis)connections in the beginning of the Allegro, bar 9, in 
the first movement of Op. 132 (Chua 1995, 81). 
 
To force this first motif into a state, one has to leap two octaves, switch from bass 
function to melodic decoration, bridge two phrases, suppress rhythmic and textural 
contrasts, discard the dynamic extremes, ignore the ‘holes’ in the bass, and omit 
ornamental ‘filling.’ 
   And even after such acrobatics, the density of the contrapuntal network destroys its 
own unity by its sheer excess of logic. There are simply too many motifs 
disconnected by registral, textural, rhythmic, and melodic shifts, so that any analytical 
reconnection becomes a schizophrenic act, with the analyst lost in a multiplicity of 
possibilities. (Chua 1995, 81.) 
 
Furthermore, Chua argues that, in the movement, there is a plot based on the 
recurrence of the opening passage, which eventually reveals the coexistence of 
opposites. As time passes, the contrasting blocks presented at the start gradually 
coincide, so that the antithetical elements of the Adagio and the Allegro begin to 
synthesize, reorientating the initial ambiguity caused by the ‘violent acts committed 
against the pitch structure.’ By the development, the contrasting elements of the 
opening start to overlap. ‘The development is certainly disruptive, but in a strange 
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way it serves to clarify the motif: instead of whittling down the motivic elements, it 
actually puts the dismembered ideas of the exposition together, revealing the 
connection between the blocks that were contrasted at the start.’ (Chua 1995, 85–6.) 
‘Thus,’ Chua concludes, 
 
as the movement unfolds, the violence which disfigured the pitch structure of the 
opening is slowly erased; parameters no longer collide against the structure but 
collude with it to elucidate connections and absorb contrasts. In time, the music partly 
undecides its indecisions, and so will revise recollections of the opening and alter 
subsequent hearings. This does not annul the ambiguity of the work but induces a 
direction and a dynamic in the play of plurality. In this way, the quartet is not so 
much a static statement of unity or disunity as a process which is always moving 
towards synthesis. (Chua 1995, 86–7.) 
 
For Chua, synthesis, however, is never attained: 
 
in a sense, the closer the synthesis between these contrasts the greater the antagonism, 
since the ambivalent gestures are forced to coalesce; the temporal violence may be 
eliminated, but that merely generates an emotional violence in which the gathering of 
an ancient polyphony (Adagio) with the march (Allegro) compresses past and 
present, sacred and secular, into a disunified unity. So intense is the concentration 
that this antagonistic fusion has repercussions throughout the entire quartet … 
causing a stratification of historical styles and engendering the emotional impasses 
between movements. Moreover, as the contrasting elements come together at the 
close of the movement the structure itself becomes ambivalent, vacillating between 
major and minor modes. (Chua 1995, 87.) 
 
In this chapter, we have seen how Daniel Chua has argued for the coexistence of unity 
and disunity in the first movement of Beethoven’s Op. 132. Chua bases his arguments 
first and foremost on motivic constructs. The significance of the motif ‘seemingly 
manufactures … a structural unity’ (Chua 1995, 74). The motivic gesture performs on 
all levels, from surface patterns to underlying structures and a ‘mono-motivic mania’ 
is likely to captivate the analyst. However, Chua also advances arguments for the 
disunity of the work. He claims the variation and counterpoint of Op. 132 
simultaneously construct and de(con)struct the score. The music undecides its 
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indecisions and a disunified unity is created. The quartet is not so much a static 
statement of unity or disunity as a process which is always moving towards synthesis. 
But synthesis is never attained. 
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6. Discussion 
 
Richard Cohn and Douglas Dempster state that the principal and most persistent 
canon (in the sense of law or rule) governing our Western aesthetic is that ‘successful 
works of art, including the “masterpieces” of Western art music, exhibit unity, 
coherence, or “organic” integrity’ (Cohn and Dempster 1992, 156). And as Fred 
Everett Maus noted in 1999: ‘Musical analysis usually tries to display musical unity. 
The goal may be stated overtly … or it may be inexplicit, though obvious.’ (Maus 
1999, 171.) However, as Maus also notes, perhaps the concept of unity has been 
unclear: ‘Perhaps we do not always know what we mean by “musical unity”’ (ibid.). 
In this essay, we have hitherto witnessed a number of ways of understanding unity in 
five Anglo-American musicological or music-theoretical articles on Beethoven’s Op. 
132, first movement, published between 1987 and 2009. 
 
Concerning the unity of the surface of the first movement of Beethoven’s Op. 132, 
Kofi Agawu (1991, 112) noted that the surface is dominated by extreme contrast. He 
identified the topics and offered a verbal description of the events taking place in the 
exposition. Agawu did find the surface highly significant, although he could not find 
that the surface would signify anything coherent. Rather, he found that defective 
enactments of a familiar construct, the circle of fifths, granted the movement relative 
coherence on the subsurface level (Agawu 1991, 120–1). Drawing upon Agawu’s 
conclusions, Susan McClary (2000, 119–21) suggested that the exposition comprised 
‘a random assortment of topoi littering the surface.’ For her, ‘[f]ew pieces offer so 
vivid an image of shattered subjectivity as the opening page of Op. 132’ (ibid., 119). 
In the end, for McClary, the fragments of the first movement acquired meaning as a 
table of contents for the subsequent movements (ibid., 124). 
 
As regards unity of form, all writers identified a certain similarity with sonata form in 
the first movement of Op. 132. However, there was a general resistance among 
analysts to take a clear stance about the formal layout of the movement. It seemed to 
be easier to keep the conversation on a meta-level, to talk about the problem of 
naming different parts of the sonata scheme, rather than getting to grips with 
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definitive answers. Agawu (1991, 118–120) claimed that it was unimportant how one 
chooses to label the individual sections of the movement ‘so long as one grasps the 
logic of tonal relations.’ McClary (2000, 124) preferred ‘to think of the movement as 
composed of three attempted expositions.’ Samarotto (2009, 23) noted aptly that the 
piece is inevitably in some kind of sonata form, but the material that informs it is too 
conflicted to support that scheme. The analysts’ refusal to label individual parts of the 
sonata scheme might be disturbing for someone seeking definitive answers. On the 
other hand, it might be more conceivable to discuss formal problems than to come up 
with ready-made solutions, which are likely to be insufficient, inefficient and 
inadequate for the music at hand. Wallace (1989, 9) suggested that Beethoven might 
have deliberately created an unstable form ‘in order to impress the listener with the 
possibility of divergent expressive interpretations.’ Eventually, the idea of deliberate 
unstability casted a shadow upon the whole unity debate. It was no longer seen as 
supportable to automatically try to understand Beethoven’s work as a unified 
composition. Rather, the work was seen as intentionally disunified. Perhaps 
Beethoven’s unstable form is a result of his dramaturgical wit and cunning in the play 
with the listener’s expectations, in the same way as it has been suggested Mozart and 
Haydn play craftily with our expectations? 
 
As regards the unity of subsurface, it was shown how different theories of subsurface 
continuity granted relative coherence to the movement as a whole. Agawu’s circle of 
fifths is a theoretical concept, an attempt at making sense of the subsurface level, 
although none of his circles was ever complete. However, the listener’s alleged 
familiarity with the construct was supposed to guarantee its perceptual significance 
(Agawu 1991, 121). Agawu’s emphasis on conflicts and irresolvable dilemmas was 
supplemented by Samarotto’s (2009, 23) view that the music is ‘conflicted to its 
core’. Wallace (1989, 15) suggested that ‘the expressive and structural elements do 
not conflict; they are literally one and the same’. According to Wallace, the 
complexity of the emotional content makes it unlikely that two listeners will hear the 
music in exactly the same manner. Therefore, Beethoven chose to capitalize on this 
fact by making the music deliberately ambiguous in as many ways as possible. 
Wallace (ibid., 16–17) suggested that the unique content of Op. 132’s is an assertion 
that an emotional message—although impossible to objectively verify—is 
nevertheless significant and may generate ‘strength and assurance rather than 
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confusion’. Perhaps this emphasis on ‘strength and assurance rather than confusion’ is 
one way of making sense of the non-sensible. 
Regarding motivic unity, Chua (1995, 83) viewed Beethoven’s Op. 132 as an ‘impure 
mixture of seemingly immiscible elements—unity and disunity together’. Why is 
motivic integration so important? Is it perhaps so, that when everything else fails, a 
four-note cell at the beginning of the piece remains the only thing to hold on to? 
Motivic integration, Chua writes, is one of those ‘processes at work, which cause an 
entire piece to unfold with a logic that creates the peculiarities of the score’ (ibid., 5). 
The fact that Chua argues with an equally convincing tone for the disunity of the work 
as for the unity of the same, and his emphasis on the dialectical opposites in the 
quartet—past and present, sacred and profane and so on—gives us reason to assume 
that Chua also thinks of the work as being deliberately ambiguous. 
 
Ideas and unities 
 
What kind of unities have been perceived in Beethoven’s Op. 132? A unity of conflict 
is a common feature of both Agawu and Samarotto. McClary sees the surface as 
utterly fragmented. Wallace suggests that the work is deliberately ambiguous in as 
many ways as possible. And Chua advocates a view of the work as simultaneously 
unified and disunified. When it all comes around, all analyses are based on the 
assumption that there is logic of some kind in the work and this logic can be 
recognised and discerned. This is related to Morgan’s (2003, 27) fundamental premise 
for musical analysis: analysis is based on the assumption that music makes sense. 
 
Maus (1999, 184) listed a variety of words and expressions associated with musical 
unity: ‘coherence’, ‘completeness’, ‘comprehensiveness’, ‘fusion’, ‘integrity’, 
‘integration’, ‘logic’, ‘organic unity’, ‘perfection’, ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘synthesis’, 
‘totality’, ‘wholeness’, and so on. We now see that several of these attributes have 
been used in the five writers’ commentaries on the unity of Beethoven’s Op. 132: 
there is coherence and incoherence, integrity and integration, logic, synthesis and self-
sufficiency. In addition to Maus’s attributes, the work has been seen as ambiguous, 
disunified, disjunctive, and discontinuous. The most important argument concerns 
coherence: the ‘bewildered’ surface is a threat to coherence, theories of subsurface 
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continuity grant relative coherence to the piece, Beethoven’s compositional process 
borders on incoherence, and so forth. 
 
Susan McClary (2000) is the one writer willing to go furthest in suggesting that 
Beethoven’s music, in Op. 132, borders on incoherence. Through her notions of the 
postmodern subject, the surface as a random assortment of apparently unrelated topoi 
and the inconsequential playing with signs (ibid., 125), she has challenged many 
musicologists’ understanding of late Beethoven. McClary talks of Beethoven as 
almost insane: ‘We may be witnessing the rantings of a madman’ (ibid., 122). 
Nevertheless, she also suggests a variety of ways, in which we may make sense of the 
music: for instance, through its historical references and through seeing the different 
ideas in the beginning as constituting a rough table of contents for the quartet as a 
whole. In her reading, McClary draws to a large extent on what Kerman and Agawu 
say, but her critique becomes most valuable and controversial when she brings in her 
own notion of the postmodern surface which exists for its own sake (ibid., 125). All 
references to historical styles and an orderly social world with religious and military 
associations add up to the impression of shattered subjectivity. Certainly, a problem 
with many readings of McClary is that she is being interpreted far too literally (see, 
for instance, Hatten 2004 and Spitzer 2006). As Hatten remarks about McClary’s 
interpretation: 
 
in attempting to turn Beethoven into a skeptic with respect to the vitality of 
conventions, and in viewing Op. 132 as a step on the way to the postmodern 
splintering of subjectivity, [McClary] has moved beyond historical reconstruction to a 
present-day appropriation of Beethoven. (Hatten 2004, 277.) 
 
Hatten may be right in criticising McClary for a present-day appropriation of 
Beethoven—her notion of the postmodern subject is, indeed, ahistorical—but 
McClary should be appreciated for bringing about new ideas. And, as McClary stated 
already in the preface, her intention was never to present any ready-made truths but to 
‘toss different ideas into the ring,’ to air ideas somewhat sketchily: 
 
I have chosen to retain as much as possible the discursive quality of the original 
lectures [on which this book is made]. Although I have expanded the texts of the five 
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hour-long talks a bit, I wanted to maintain the sense of interconnection among the 
chapters rather than allowing each to become the book-length study it obviously 
deserves. But I hope the ideas that emerge from my assemblage will justify its odd 
juxtapositions and compensate for its more-than-occasional sketchiness. 
(McClary 2000, xii.) 
Unity and analysis 
 
Morgan (2003, 27) contended that analysis is based on the assumption that music 
makes sense. No matter how disunified the analysts initially perceived the work, all 
analysts, in the end, revealed underlying structures which granted the work coherence 
and logic, at least on some level, with regard to some parameter: harmony, 
expression, dramaturgy, to name but a few. Speaking about the search for unity in 
musical analysis, Morgan (2003, 23) also stated that ‘a focus on unity … exaggerates 
the integrity of the whole, making us blind to inconsistencies and discontinuities that 
would emerge under less restrictive interpretative rubrics.’ Having discussed in detail 
five articles dealing with unity—or the lack thereof—we can under no circumstances 
conclude that the present writers would have closed their eyes to inconsistencies or 
discontinuities. Rather, the inconsistencies and discontinuities were treated with due 
respect. 
 
Morgan is right in saying that to claim that a composition lacks unity necessarily 
silences the analyst (ibid., 27). However, none of the five writers claimed that 
Beethoven’s Op. 132 lacked unity. What they claimed was that some parts of the 
work were disunified. Correspondingly, some parts were unified, at least on some 
level. More importantly, when the work seemed discontinuous or disunified, there 
was often a reason for it. Hence, Morgan’s 2003 call for an analysis showing that the 
disunity itself is meaningful had been answered—fourteen years earlier—by Wallace 
(1989) who suggested Beethoven’s composition is deliberately—that is, 
intentionally—ambiguous. 
 
Chua’s (1995, 9) conclusions on the suitability of Beethoven’s late quartets to 
(systematic) analysis are far-reaching. He is right in saying that there can be no 
systematic method of analysing Beethoven’s late quartets, since they constantly 
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undermine analysis and challenge all analytical systems and analysts. Also, his own 
self-reflecting and ironic remark on his ‘calligraphic patterns’ is a case in point: 
‘What is significant is what lies outside the graphs. Is it not strange that they deal only 
with pitches?’ (Chua 1995, 81.) This raises important questions about our analytical 
tools: How important is pitch for musical analysis, and for the overall impression of a 
musical work in the first place, relative to rhythm, dynamics and timbre? As long as 
our analytical tools are dominated by pitch-centered methods such as Shenkerian 
analysis, we will continue to seek unities primarily based on pitch. 
 
Historical observations 
 
The material analysed here is not suitable for making judgements of historical 
development, specifically for two reasons: the number of articles within the time 
period of 22 years being too small, and the articles representing distinctly different 
analytical traditions. However, a few general historical observations can be made. 
First, the discussion about the sonata form of the movement shows perhaps most 
clearly how musicological research has moved away from pinpointing readily 
identifiable elements of form towards embracing the ambiguous and disunified. The 
analysts’ refusal to identify conventional sonata-form sections is perhaps, more than 
anything, a postmodern phenomenon. Second, it has become commonplace to mix 
Schenkerian analysis with other analytical methods, such as new musicology and 
literary theory (McClary), aspects of temporal and formal analysis (Samarotto), 
dramaturgical interpretation (Wallace), semiotic methodology (Agawu) and custom-
made analytical tools (Chua). 
 
Kevin Korsyn has argued that the discourses in historical musicology, 
ethnomusicology and music theory tend to be more isolated and exclusive these days 
than before: ‘Like gears that do not mesh, their discourses cannot engage each other’ 
(Korsyn 2003, 6). With the present results at hand, I, however, find that the 
musicological and music-theoretical discourses have come surprisingly close to each 
other. Coming from such different scholarly traditions, the five writers did manage to 
engage in a successful and rich debate over issues of unity in Beethoven’s Op. 132. 
Although the musicological and music-theoretical traditions are in some respects 
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different, differences can be bridged and overcome. Discourses can engage in 
dialogue. 
 
All in all, the present writers’ positive attitude towards embracing the ambiguous and 
disunified in Beethoven’s Op. 132 can be related to some greater changes in the 
Anglo-American musicological field of the past 30 years: first, a widening of the field 
in general, second, Adorno’s texts becoming available in English translations to an 
English-speaking public, and last, partly due to the two aforementioned events, a turn 
towards accepting if not embracing the ambiguous and disunified, disrupted and 
incoherent in musicology in general. It may be called a symptom of the postmodern 
age that a musical work may these days be seen as deliberately ambiguous or 
intentionally disunified. However, compared with earlier accounts of the alleged unity 
of Beethoven’s late quartets (see, for instance, Cooke 1963), this constitutes a 
remarkable shift in discourse. Unity does no longer exist in the musical work but in 
the perceiver’s mind. It is of secondary importance to the work, but of primary 
importance to our understanding of it. The shift is not only a shift in emphasis, but a 
paradigmatic one. 
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